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 SUMMARY 
This paper seeks to answer questions 
posed by theoretical, methodological and 
descriptive research. Theoretically, to 
what extent is economic structure related 
to competitiveness and growth perform-
ance? Is there such a thing as ‘struc-
tural competitiveness’? The main finding 
here is that the quality properties of 
economic activity are what matter in the 
long run, not what countries specialize 
in. ‘Good specialization’ in the short and 
medium run can bring spectacular im-
provement in performance and in com-
petitiveness. 
Although the Hungarian manufac-
turing mix underwent huge changes in 
the transition period, extent of structural 
rearrangement cannot itself be called an 
achievement. Comprehensive rearrange-
ment does not necessarily lead to above-
average competitiveness. Calculations of 
the extent of structural change need to 
be augmented by indicators of the qual-
ity properties of structural change, such 
as productivity, import ratio of produc-
tion, or share of value added in total 
turnover. Analysis of the relation between 
economic structure and competitiveness 
should not be restricted to commodity 
structure. It should cover the economic 
role of services and agriculture and the 
manufacturing mix. Analysts usually see 
agriculture as a low-technology, low-
productivity sector. Yet international sta-
tistics show its productivity has improved 
even faster than that of manufacturing 
in many developed OECD countries. In-
creased structural similarity, in terms of 
a rapidly rising GDP share of industry 
and services at the expense of agricul-
ture, should not be achieved by neglect-
ing agriculture. It is unwise to ignore 
the considerable productivity-enhancing 
effect of the primary sector. 
The methodological question con-
cerns the analytical value of individual 
structural indicators. What do these il-
luminate and what do they conceal? Em-
phasis is given to the analytical value of 
the technological content of production 
and export. The paper concludes that a 
high share of high-technology or ICT 
products within total output or exports 
does not in itself indicate above-average 
competitiveness. (1) An increase in the 
share of technology-intensive branches in 
total manufacturing value added does 
not shed light on the competitiveness fac-
tors with which this improving indicator 
can be explained (pure cost competitive-
ness or high local marketing competence, 
local innovation potential etc.) (2) The 
relatively small weight of high-technology 
industries in total manufacturing value 
added should also be noted. 
The analysis is based on structural 
data from the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean (CEE) countries. The paper tries to 
discover whether and how structural 
changes in these countries match global 
tendencies. 
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INTRODUCTION AND                         
OVERVIEW 
The relationship between economic struc-
ture (sectoral structure and manufactur-
ing mix) and competitiveness is a con-
troversial, widely debated theoretical is-
sue. The assumptions that structure and 
aggregate performance are mutually de-
pendent and structural change (realloca-
tion of productive inputs across indus-
trial activities) is an important source of 
growth are commonplace in literature.1 
Kuznets 1979 states it is impossible to 
attain high rates of per capita growth 
without substantial shifts in the relative 
weights of sectors. The contribution of 
various industries to aggregate TFP (total 
factor productivity) growth shows wide 
variation. Returns to scale differ across 
sectors. What is more, the leading indus-
tries change over time. This suggests that 
crucial elements in the differences be-
tween countries’ economic performance 
are their capability to switch to fast-
growing sectors by changing their spe-
cialization and the speed at which they 
can do so. 
Aggregate growth can be decom-
posed into a structural component, re-
flecting the effect of changes in the 
composition of the aggregate, and a 
quality component, reflecting the effect 
of changes within the factors making up 
                                                 
1 The concept dates back to Schumpeter 1928, 
Fisher 1939, Clark 1940, Fourastié 1949, etc. 
the aggregate (e.g. productivity improve-
ment within various sectors), with the 
help of shift-share analysis.2 In contrast 
to the apparent logic of the assumption 
on the strong, causal relation between 
structural change and growth, the re-
sults of most quantification exercises do 
not support the claim that structure is a 
robust explanatory factor of perform-
ance.3 The cited studies agree that the 
structural component of growth is not as 
significant as it seems at first sight.  
Recent experience in countries spe-
cialized in information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) manufacturing 
seems to contradict these theoretical as-
sumptions, however. In the 1990s, ICT 
specialization showed strong correlation 
with above-average growth and export 
performance, and with rapid catching 
up. 
This paper discusses whether this 
new experience calls for modification of 
the theoretical assumption that there is a 
poor relation between economic structure 
and growth and competitiveness. Is it 
‘good specialization’ that determines the 
competitiveness and growth performance 
of a country, or is it other factors? An-
other research question addressed in this 
paper is the analytical strength of indi-
vidual structural indicators. What can 
structural indicators illuminate and what 
do they conceal? The analysis rests on 
structural data from CEE countries, since 
the paper also explores whether and 
                                                 
2 For a literature review and criticism of the 
application, see Timmer and Szirmai 2000. 
3 Examples include Esteban 2000, Fagerberg 
2000 and Peneder 1999. 
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how these countries’ structural changes 
match global tendencies. Hungary’s ex-
perience in this respect is compared with 
that of other CEE countries. 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 
Hungary’s structural transformation is 
considered one of the deepest of any 
CEE country in the first decade of tran-
sition. Hitherto absent manufacturing ac-
tivities introduced by foreign investors 
included car assembly or office and 
computing machinery. The share of high 
technology-intensive manufacturing has 
greatly increased, while that of low-
technology industries has significantly de-
clined. 
Table 1 quantifies the extent Hun-
garian manufacturing structure was re-
arranged and compares it with the ex-
perience of other CEE countries. 
The question is whether the extent 
of the structural rearrangement can be 
called an achievement in itself – whether 
comprehensive rearrangement points to 
above-average competitiveness. 
The answer is yes and no. Yes, be-
cause the period of structural change 
coincided with transformation into a 
market economy and in this way con-
tributed to rectifying the structural dis-
tortions of the command economy. The 
structural change coincided with reinte-
gration into the world economy and 
global patterns of manufacturing, and it 
was driven by foreign direct investment. 
These circumstances supplied the com-
petitiveness-enhancing character of the 
Table 1
Structural change in manufacturing, 1989–200, constant 1996 prices, % 
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Food products, beverages & tobacco -0.4 2.2 -10.7 -.2.2 5.6 -4.2 1.9 
Textiles & textile products 0.7 -2.6 -3.4 -3.3 -0.1 -3.5 -1.9 
Leather & leather products -0.3 -1.6 -0.9 -1.1 0.4 -1.1 -1.7 
Wood & wood products 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 1.0 -0.7 -1.0 -1.4 
Pulp, paper, publishing & printing 1.9 2.0 -0.7 2.8 -0.3 2.7 -2.0 
Coke, refined petroleum products, fuel 3.2 -2.5 -4.3 -1.4 -0.8 1.1 -0.4 
Chemicals, chemical products, man-made fibres 2.0 2.2 -10.8 -2.0 -3.6 -1.4 0.5 
Rubber & plastic products -0.1 1.1 1.0 3.0 -2.2 0.4 1.5 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.5 0.6 -1.2 0.2 -0.6 -0.7 2.0 
Basic metals & fabricated metal products 1.7 -4.5 -5.2 -1.2 -6.0 3.4 0.3 
Machinery & equipment n.e.c. 1.8 -7.1 -0.8 -2.5 0.2 -8.6 -.01 
Electrical & optical equipment -4.0 6.2 30.7 2.7 1.8 0.5 2.6 
Transport equipment -6.6 2.8 6.9 3.7 3.7 12.8 -1.8 
Manufacturing n.e.c. -0.8 1.5 -0.6 0.2 2.5 -0.5 0.5 
Total percentage rearranged 12.2 18.6 38.6 13.6 14.2 21.0 9.3 
Source: Gács 2003, p. 143. 
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changes. Yet the importance of structural 
change should not be overemphasized 
even in the decade of transformation. 
Although patterns of specialization are 
dynamic and evolve over time, rapid 
structural change on a scale much 
greater than the average for the devel-
oped countries does not necessarily re-
flect a competitiveness improvement in 
the country undergoing the change. It 
may be taking place in a rather under-
developed country, whose GDP level (the 
denominator of structural-change calcula-
tions) falls below a certain threshold. 
Rapid and excessive changes in the 
cross-section distribution of economic ac-
tivities are usually exogenously driven, 
whereas the specialization dynamics of 
developed countries evolves much more 
endogenously, being driven by factor 
proportions (and changes in them) and 
by agglomeration forces. 
Furthermore, developed countries do 
not exclusively respond to intensification 
of competitive pressure with inter-
industry rearrangement. It is more a 
question of quality upgrading within in-
dustries – specialization in the more 
knowledge and technology-intensive seg-
ments of industries and in higher value-
added products within the segments. So 
the pure extent of inter-industry rear-
rangement of production and export 
specialization refers to competitiveness 
improvement only under the specific cir-
cumstances of transformation. And even 
in there, calculations of the extent of 
structural change should be comple-
mented with indicators reflecting the 
quality properties of that change.  
QUALITY AND QUANTITY IN-
DICATORS OF ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE 
An important quality indicator to add to 
analysis of changes in the industry struc-
ture of a country’s GDP is productivity 
– value added per hour worked.4 There 
are huge differences, even between de-
veloped countries, in their productivity 
levels, so that the indicator of industry-
specific productivity level5 is very infor-
mative, when making international com-
parisons and when quantifying the dy-
namics of catching up. If the distribution 
of shares of GDP of industries in a 
catching-up country resembles that of an 
advanced economy, but productivity lev-
els in such industries remain far below 
those in benchmark countries, the catch-
ing-up process will still be protracted, 
however up-to-date the economic struc-
ture may be. 
Another telling quality indicator is 
the import ratio of production. A coun-
try is usually considered highly competi-
tive if its export structure shows large 
                                                 
4 Eurostat publishes apparent labor productivity 
data of value added per persons employed in its 
series Statistics in Focus. Although this calculation 
method includes significant distortions (there are 
considerable differences among member states in 
terms of average hours worked per employee see 
Van Bastelaer and Vaguer 2004), the series pro-
vides useful data for international comparisons 
and issues since May 2004 also include the data 
for new members.  
5 Indicators of productivity improvement trends 
are less valuable without level of productivity, as 
catching-up countries, especially those in which 
the improvement is driven by foreign investors, 
usually show a ‘latecomer’ type of above average 
productivity improvement. 
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shares for emerging, technology-intensive 
industries. These are considered strategic 
because of the high export intensity of 
their production, so that their contribu-
tion to the total value of gross exports 
is considerable. Technology-intensive 
products, however, have high import in-
tensity, which means that production of 
them has a relatively low ratio of local 
value added. Import intensity, of course, 
is very hard to influence with economic-
policy measures, as it is more or less 
industry specific. High import ratios are 
typical for global industries such as of-
fice equipment or telecom equipment 
manufacturing. The lesson for economic 
policy is not to try to ‘organize for local 
suppliers’ at any cost, but to calculate 
net exports instead of gross exports in 
its analyses, before taking decisions 
about economic policy and the selection 
of strategic industries.6 
Another way to complement the 
picture that emerges out of international 
comparisons of industry composition by 
technology intensity is to analyse the 
countries’ contributions to world or to 
EU GDP in particular industries. Consider 
the case of Germany, often blamed for 
not having a particularly up-to-date in-
dustrial structure (Klodt and Maurer 
1995; Siebert and Stolpe 2001). Accord-
ing to Eurostat data, Germany’s high-tech 
exports amounted to 15.8 per cent of 
total exports in 2001, as opposed to an 
EU 15 average of 19.8 per cent. Ger-
many’s indicator pales by comparison 
                                                 
6 Calculating net exports at industry level, how-
ever, calls for a series of field investigations, as 
no reliable industry-level data is available. 
with Ireland’s (40.8 per cent) or even 
established EU members’ like France’s 
(25.6 per cent) or the United Kingdom’s 
(26.4 per cent, Strack 2004).The extent 
to which the indicator of high-tech ex-
ports over total exports distorts conclu-
sions about competitiveness becomes con-
spicuous if the contribution of Germany 
to EU 25 value added by industries is 
examined. It becomes clear (Storm 2004) 
that at two-digit NACE level of manufac-
turing activities, Germany in most cases 
belongs to the top two contributors (not 
only in low-tech, medium low-tech and 
medium high-tech industries, but in high-
tech ones, too).7 
As for the main quantity indicators, 
analysis of the relation between economic 
structure and competitiveness should not 
be restricted to the commodity structure. 
The economic role of services and agri-
culture need analysing along with the 
manufacturing mix. According to the 
WTO, the economic weight of services, 
especially strategic business services, has 
continued to increase in terms of the 
sector’s GDP share and of its trade per-
formance, i.e. its export share. Analysts 
benchmarking the structural performance 
of catch-up economies usually attach 
                                                 
7 For instance, Germany is top contributor to EU 
25 value added in the food industry (18.5 per 
cent of total value added), manufacture of pulp 
and paper products (20.7 per cent), chemicals 
and chemical products (24.9 per cent), rubber 
and plastic products (27 per cent), fabricated 
metal products (27.5 per cent), machinery and 
equipment (37.4 per cent), office machinery and 
computers (22.3 per cent), motor vehicles (47.1 
per cent) and several others. It is second largest 
contributor in another industry classed as high-
tech: manufacture of radio, television and com-
munication equipment (17.4 per cent, Storm 
2004). 
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much importance to employment reallo-
cation from agriculture and industry to 
services. The next few paragraphs argue 
that the simplest quantitative objective of 
structural similarity in the 21st century 
often misses the point.  
Table 2 
The GDP share of services  
and of business services 
(2001, %) 
 
 Services Business services
Austria 67.1 47.2 
Czech Republic 55.8 40.9 
Denmark 71.7 45.6 
Finland 64.2 43.0 
France 72.5 49.3 
Germany 69.4 48.0 
Hungary 64.4 42.9 
Ireland 54.5 38.5 
Italy 69.5 50.0 
Japan 67.9 46.3 
Korea 53.9 37.8 
Netherlands 71.4 48.4 
Poland 65.0 44.4 
Slovakia 63.8 48.8 
Spain 67.9 47.7 
United Kingdom 72.6 50.6 
United States     77.3 55.3 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators Database, 2004 
No. 01  
 
By now, pure structural similarity 
indicators have ceased to be as telling in 
the case of transforming economies, as 
they were in the socialist era, when the 
share of services was considerably lower, 
than that in developed countries. The 
macroeconomic structures of transform-
ing countries have become much more 
similar to those of developed countries. 
Although transforming economies have 
undergone a manufacturing-based mod-
ernization process, the share of services 
has spectacularly increased.  
Differences in the macroeconomic 
structure have prevailed in two respects. 
The share of strategic business services 
and the weight of service exports both 
remain below those found in developed 
countries (Table 2 and Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
The volume of exports of commercial ser-
vices (ECS) and share of service exports in 
commodity exports (CE), 2002 
 
Country ECS      USD billion ECS/CE % 
USA 272.6 39.3 
UK 123.1 44.0 
Germany 99.6 16.2 
France 85.9 25.9 
Japan 64.9 15.6 
Spain 62.1 52.1 
Hong Kong 45.2 23.7 
Austria 34.9 44.3 
Ireland 28.1 31.9 
Korea 27.1 16.7 
Denmark 25.5 44.7 
India 23.5 47.7 
Sweden 22.5 27.7 
Poland 10.1 24.6 
Hungary 7.7 22.4 
Czech Republic 7.0 18.2 
Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics, and 
own calculations. 
 
Table 3 presents the volume of ser-
vice exports and their share in commod-
ity exports, among leading service ex-
porters and some transforming countries. 
The indicators reflect a much larger gap 
between the developed countries and the 
new EU members than the one indicated 
by simple structural-similarity compari-
sons (GDP shares of individual sectors). 
This makes them more useful tools of 
competitiveness analyses. 
Economists usually see agriculture 
as a traditional, low-technology, low-
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productivity sector. A simplistic interpre-
tation of such analyses could also sug-
gest that the more economic weight agri-
culture loses, the more a country’s com-
petitiveness improves. International pro-
ductivity statistics, on the other hand, 
show in the past decade the significant 
productivity improvement that could be 
observed in developed countries, not only 
as the result of productivity improvement 
in manufacturing. Although academic 
journals and press news kept emphasiz-
ing the tremendous productivity im-
provement in information technology-
producing sectors, analysis of productiv-
ity data reveals that in many of devel-
oped OECD countries, the productivity of 
agriculture improved even faster than 
that of manufacturing.  
Table 4 
Labour productivity improvement 2001/1990 
(%) 
 
 Agriculture Manufacturing
Austria 170.5 151.9 
Belgium 154.5 134.8 
Canada 133.7 139.6 
Denmark 194.4 132.8 
Finland 180.5 173.4 
France 148.6 146.6 
Germany 119.0 114.5 
Italy 176.0 124.8 
Netherlands 130.5 132.5 
Norway 179.6 110.8 
Portugal 134.6 130.7 
Spain 154.2 119.2 
Sweden 134.9 195.5 
United Kingdom 99.6 131.5 
United States 127.7 147.0 
Source: OECD, STAN Indicators Database, 2004 
No. 01, own calculations. 
The data in Table 4 confirm that 
the productivity role of agriculture 
should not be ignored. The main struc-
tural problem with agriculture for new 
EU members is not its sheer size – the 
excessive GDP share of the sector – but 
its inferior productivity, poor mechaniza-
tion and bad environmental management. 
Increased structural similarity in terms of 
a rapidly rising GDP share of industry 
and services at the expense of agricul-
ture should be achieved not by neglect-
ing agriculture. The economic policy of 
catching-up countries has to promote 
technological upgrading of agriculture, 
incorporation of new agro-biotechnology 
etc., and should not renounce the con-
siderable productivity-enhancing effect of 
the primary sector.  
STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN 
HUNGARY AND GLOBAL 
STRUCTURAL TENDENCIES 
 
The technological content          
of production and exports 
The apparent improvement in Hungary’s 
competitiveness in the 1990s is strongly 
linked to changes in the composition of 
its manufacturing mix, i.e. to the spec-
tacular increase in the manufacturing 
and export shares of high-technology in-
dustries in general and information tech-
nology hardware in particular.  
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Table 6 
Share of ICT-producing industries 
in total manufacturing value added 
(%) 
 
 1995 1999 2000 2001 
Austria 7.2 7.0 7.5 6.8 
Czech Republic 2.7 3.6 4.2 - 
Finland 8.9 20.1 22.4 19.2 
France 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.1 
Germany 4.9 5.5 6.3 5.1 
Hungary - 9.6 9.5 9.5 
Ireland 15.0 16.3 - - 
Italy 4.2 3.5 4.6 4.1 
Japan 12.7 13.9 15.1 12.6 
Korea 15.4 16.7 18.1 - 
Poland - 5.5 4.7 - 
Spain 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 
United Kingdom 8.3 8.9 - - 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators Database, 2004 
No. 01 
 
Table 5 gives an international com-
parison of the share of high-technology 
industries (including not only ICT, but 
pharmaceuticals, aerospace, scientific in-
struments, etc.) and Table 6 the evolu-
tion of the manufacturing 
share of ICT. The spectacular 
evolution of these quantity 
indicators, in line with the 
main structural tendencies 
worldwide, has greatly im-
proved the performance of 
the country, but not neces-
sarily its competitiveness. A 
high share of high-technology 
or ICT products within total 
output or exports does not 
point in itself to above-
average competitiveness in 
itself, for two reasons. 
(1) Changes in the composi-
tion of the manufacturing 
mix do not reveal the an-
swer to the big question of what 
kind of competitiveness factors the 
high (increasing) share of technology-
intensive branches in total manufac-
turing value added can be explained 
by. Is it pure cost competitiveness, 
due to a relatively low wage level, 
or some other type of competence 
offering more sustainable competi-
tiveness, such as network compe-
tence, marketing competence, local 
innovation potential, etc. These ques-
tions can be answered by examining 
the evolution of various industry 
characteristics. One is the share of 
net wages within companies’ total 
costs and within total value added. 
According to calculations in Pitti 
2003 and 2005, the share of net 
wages in Hungary continued to di-
minish in Hungary from 1995 to 
2003, within companies’ total costs 
Table 5 
Share of high-technology value added  
in total manufacturing value added 
(%) 
 
 1988 1992 1995 1999 2000 2001 
Austria 9.3 9.8 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.3 
Czech Republic - 1.5 5.2 5.7 6.2 - 
Denmark 9.0 10.3 10.8 14.4 15 15.3 
Finland 6.8 8.0 11.0 21.8 23.7 21.4 
France 11.7 11.7 13.0 14.0 14.0 14.1 
Germany 10.6 10.3 8.8 10.4 11.1 10.4 
Hungary - - - 14.0 14.5 15.3 
Ireland - 17.2 22.9 25.5 - - 
Italy 8.9 8.9 8.2 8.9 9.2 9.8 
Japan 15.9 15.3 16.0 17.8 18.7 16.7 
Korea 15.7 13.9 18.6 19.7 21.2 - 
Poland - - - 7.7 6.9 - 
Spain 6.8 7.5 7.1 6.7 6.6 6.9 
United Kingdom 14.1 14.4 14.5 16.3 17.1 - 
USA           20.3 21.4 20.1 22.1 23.0 - 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators Database, 2004 No. 01. 
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and within total value added. Since 
gross wages in ICT production make 
up a large part of local value added 
in transforming and developing coun-
tries specialized in ICT manufactur-
ing, Pitti’s results point to a lack of 
quality upgrading in these industries. 
The high share of wages in total 
value added suggests labour intensity 
of local production. In fact, although 
the production technology is highly 
technology-intensive and the output 
(office machinery parts and compo-
nents) is also high-tech, the process-
ing activity is not knowledge-
intensive. It does not need special 
education or skills. Technology and 
knowledge intensity should therefore 
be examined not at industry level – 
following the OECD industry classifi-
cation of low, medium-low, medium-
high and high-technology industries – 
but on an industry-segment level, or 
even one of specific manufacturing 
activity (Thompson and Thompson 
1985). Another industry feature con-
nected with the factors that explain 
competitiveness is the share of value 
added in total turnover. According to 
Eurostat (Götzfried 2004), the aver-
age value of this indicator was 22 
per cent in Hungarian manufacturing 
in 2001, but only 18 per cent in 
high-tech manufacturing. These com-
pare poorly with EU 25 averages of 
27 and 28 per cent. 
(2) The second reason is the still tiny 
weight of these industries. Much 
higher than the average growth and 
productivity performance by the ICT 
sector often allows experts and deci-
sion-makers forget that the sector in-
fluences a tiny part of the economy 
and even of manufacturing, com-
pared the weights of industries of 
medium or low technology intensity. 
No matter how spectacularly the per-
formance of an industry evolves, if it 
hardly contributes to total manufac-
turing performance, the aggregate 
indicators will undergo only a minor 
change. 
Table 7 
Share of ICT production and of industries 
featuring low technology intensity8 (LTI) in 
total manufacturing value added, % 
 
 
ICT LTI 
 2000 2001 2000 2001 
Austria 7.5 6.8 35.6 35.0 
Czech Republic 4.2 - 34.2 - 
Finland 22.4 19.2 37.8 37.3 
France 6.8 6.1 31.7 31.8 
Germany 6.3 5.1 24.1 23.2 
Hungary 9.5 9.5 30.4 33.3 
Ireland* 16.3 - 37 - 
Italy 4.6 4.1 37.9 38.8 
Japan 15.1 12.6 29.8 30.1 
Korea 18.1 - 21.3 21.7 
Poland 4.7 - 44.2 - 
Spain 3.3 3.2 37.4 37.4 
United Kingdom* 8.9 - 36.8 37.3 
United States    - - 30.8 31.2 
* 1999 data. 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators Database, 2004 
No. 01. 
 
Table 7 compares the manufactur-
ing shares of ICT production and that of 
low technology industries. The data show 
that even in countries classified as spe-
                                                 
8 The technological classification of manufacturing 
industries follows the OECD (Directorate for Sci-
ence Technology and Industry) guidelines pro-
vided in the STAN Indicators Database (Annex 3, 
pp. 28-31) 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/21576665.pdf. 
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cialized in high-technology manufactur-
ing, such as Ireland and Finland, or 
even in developed OECD countries, in-
dustries featuring low technology inten-
sity contribute to a considerable share of 
total manufacturing value added.  
Research and development                   
intensity 
Much has been written about the dra-
matic changes in the innovative activities 
in CEE countries, taking place as a con-
sequence of industrial transformation.9 
Local R and D intensity of produc-
tion in most transforming countries is 
still far behind that of advanced econo-
mies, although dissolution of science and 
technology systems and reduction of re-
                                                 
9 Dyker 1997; Radosevic 1998. 
sources for local R and D were slowly 
ending and the trend gradually reversing 
by the second half of the 1990s.10  
Table 8 gives an international com-
parison of R and D expenditures as a 
percentage of value added in manufac-
turing and Tables 9 and 10 quantify the 
evolution of the same indicator in two 
selected mature industries: machinery and 
equipment, and transport equipment.11 
The huge differences in R and D inten-
sity between more and less advanced 
economies are conspicuous. R and D in-
tensity shows a continually increasing 
trend in advanced economies, while the 
                                                 
10 This took the form of new R and D estab-
lishments, increasing R and D expenditures, and 
home-base exploiting, home-base augmenting and 
technology-acquiring investments in local R and 
D. On the classification of investment in R and 
D, see Le Bas and Sierra 2002. On the reversal of 
the trend, see Inzelt 2003. 
11 Unfortunately the OECD STAN Indicators Da-
tabase does not contain data for Hungary. 
Table 8
Business R and D expenditures (BRD) as a proportion of value added in manufacturing, % 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Belgium 5.2 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.4 6.8 7.7 
Czech Republic 2.8 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Denmark 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.7 5.1 5.1 5.9 6.0 - - 
Finland 5.5 5.1 5.4 5.6 6.8 7.2 7.5 8.6 8.8 9.4 
France 7.3 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.3 6.9 6.8 7.1 6.9 - 
Germany 6.4 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.5 7.7 7.7 
Ireland 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 - - 
Italy 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 
Japan 7.4 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.5 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.9 
Korea - - - 5.2 5.6 5.6 4.7 4.7 5.3 6.0 
Netherlands 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.1 5.8 5.6 - 
Poland - - 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.0 
Spain 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 
United Kingdom 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.9 60. 6.6 
United States 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.1 8.9 9.1 8.8 8.3 8.5 - 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators Database, 2004 No. 01  
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trend in catching-up economies is much 
less clear. Average R and D intensity in 
manufacturing hides considerable indus-
try-specific differences. 
Concentration, specialization and 
competitiveness 
When examining the structural indicators 
of developed countries to see how the 
Hungarian changes fit into global ten-
dencies, some time was devoted to the 
competitiveness aspects of concentration 
and specialization. Although concentration 
refers to the geographical concentration 
of industries this paper examines concen-
tration patterns at country level, explor-
ing the extent to which Hungary – as 
opposed to some advanced economies – 
relies on one (or a couple of) sectors of 
economic activity. The other side of the 
coin is specialization of regions, or in 
this paper of countries. There are several 
methods of measuring specialization 
(Herfindahl index, Gini index, etc.) This 
paper considers a country specialized if 
the average deviation of the share of 
each industry in the total national manu-
facturing value added is higher than the 
EU average, in line with the method ap-
plied by Eurostat in Storm 2004. 
 The Hungarian production and 
trade structure is considered highly con-
centrated. A small number of products 
and companies account for a large share 
of output and export.12 High concentra-
tion is assessed as unhealthy because it 
makes the country vulnerable to fluctua-
tions in the international business cycle.  
 
 
                                                 
12 In 2000, the share of the top three foreign-
owned exporters in total Hungarian exports 
came to 25.1 per cent. Source: Figyelő, TOP 200, 
2001. 
Table 9
BRD as a percentage of value added in machinery and equipment 
(%, NACE 29) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Belgium 12.6 12.7 12.5 12.2 11.9 12 12.1 13.5 14.3 16.5 
Czech Republic 5.0 4.4 3.1 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.2 - 
Denmark 8.3 9.1 8.4 8.7 8.8 8.7 9.3 9.5 - - 
Finland 12.3 11.9 13.8 14.5 16.2 17.2 17.3 19.1 18.4 19.8 
France 14.1 15.1 15.2 13.9 13.4 13 12.3 12.1 12.9 - 
Germany 8.6 9.3 9.3 9.7 9.1 8.6 8.6 8.9 8.4 9.4 
Ireland 5.7 6.8 7.5 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.1 6.0 - - 
Italy 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.7 5.1 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.7 
Japan 12.9 13.6 14.5 14.6 14.6 15.1 16.5 17.2 17.2 19.9 
Korea - - - 10.7 11.9 13.1 13.2 13.3 12.3 18.1 
Netherlands 10.3 11.0 12.9 13.9 15.0 15.4 15.0 16.9 17.6 - 
Poland - - 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.3 3.3 3.2 2.5 - 
Spain 5.5 5.1 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.6 5.1 4.9 4.6 3.8 
United Kingdom 9.0 9.4 7.9 7.1 7.1 6.4 6.8 7.3 8.0 9.9 
United States 13.8 12.8 13.2 13.7 15.7 17.4 16.3 15.4 16.5 - 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators Database, 2004 No. 01  
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Table 11 
Concentration of manufacturing in 2000. 
The shares of TOP 5 and TOP 10 three-digit 
industries in total manufacturing value 
added, % 
 
 TOP 5 TOP 10 
Austria 23.3 42.4 
Denmark 31.4 49.0 
Germany 32.8 52.1 
Ireland 44.7 55.6 
Finland 48.6 64.7 
Netherlands* 33.0 50.9 
United Kingdom 26.0 45.2 
Czech Republic 24.8 42.4 
Hungary 37.6 55.9 
* 1999 data source: Structural Statistics for In-
dustry and Services – Production Data, OECD, 
2003. Own calculations.  
 
Table 11 puts the concentration of 
Hungarian manufacturing in a compara-
tive perspective. The shares of TOP 5 
and TOP 10 three-digit industries in total 
manufacturing value added have been 
calculated, to determine whether the 
concentration is more or less industry-
specific. Countries specialized in informa-
tion technology like Ireland or Finland 
feature similarly high (and in some cases 
even higher) concentrations than Hun-
gary.  
As the Irish and Finnish perform-
ances suggest, the rate of concentration 
cannot be called bad or good in itself. If 
high concentration is due to a low de-
nominator (low total manufacturing value 
added) – the establishment and running 
up of production by a new multinational 
company that locates production of a 
specific product (group) in Hungary and 
supplies the whole world from this loca-
tion – this easily results in a high con-
centration. In this case, much of total 
manufacturing output and exports come 
to depend on the decisions of a single 
investor. If, however, high concentration 
is the result of a dense network of re-
lated companies operating in the same 
industry, such as the Finnish knowledge 
Table 10
BRD as a proportion of value added in transport equipment 
(%, NACE 34–35) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Belgium 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.5 4.3 4.2 4.8 
Czech Republic 6.8 9.4 10.4 15.9 10.1 12.6 14.7 12.4 10.3 - 
Denmark 1.5 1.2 2.3 1.4 4.4 5.0 4.6 6.4 - - 
Finland 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.6 4.6 2.9 3.8 4.4 
France 23.2 26.4 22.5 21.7 23.9 17.6 16.6 17.3 17.1 - 
Germany 15.3 18.2 16.9 16.6 17.9 18.0 17.9 20 23.1 18.0 
Ireland 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.5 4.2 4.1 3.6 3.1 - - 
Italy 17.2 17.2 13.5 11.8 13.1 10.2 9.6 10.7 10.2 12.1 
Japan 11.6 10.4 10.2 11.3 12.1 13.6 12.7 11.9 12.7 13.4 
Korea - - - 11.3 12.1 12.4 7.5 5.4 8.0 6.7 
Netherlands 9.3 10.9 7.5 8.1 4.2 5.5 3.8 5.0 3.9 - 
Poland - - 3.6 3.7 2.6 3.6 3.6 5.3 3.2 - 
Spain 5.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.2 3.7 4.2 4.7 3.6 4.4 
United Kingdom 14.5 12.6 11.8 13.2 12.5 12.1 12.8 15.5 14.0 15.9 
United States 23.5 20.6 19.4 22.2 22.8 21.0 17.2 18.5 16.2 - 
Source: OECD STAN Indicators Database, 2004 No. 01  
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cluster round Nokia, high concentration 
does not make the economy prohibitively 
vulnerable. 
As for specialization, the summary 
and data in Storm 2004 show Hungary 
to be slightly more specialized in terms 
of value added than the EU 25 average. 
The most specialized EU members include 
both highly developed countries like Ire-
land and economies with big scope for 
further catching-up and cohesion like 
Latvia. Also observable are wide gaps 
between the development levels of certain 
of the least specialized countries, such as 
Austria, Slovenia and Portugal. So it can 
be concluded that level of specialization 
in itself has minimal explanatory power 
for development levels and prospects. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis suggests that specialization 
is not what determines countries’ com-
petitiveness, but the quality indicators of 
production, especially productivity and 
local value added. Coincidence of trans-
formation and intensification of fragmen-
tation and vertical specialization initiated 
dramatic structural change in some 
countries. In some developed and catch-
ing-up countries, the relation between 
economic structure and competitiveness 
plainly looks strong. Other countries fea-
ture strong competitiveness despite an 
outdated, traditional structure. These 
cases support the idea that there is no 
‘optimal economic structure’. In the long 
term, what matters is not what countries 
specialize in, but the quality properties 
of economic activity. In the short and 
medium run, ‘good specialization’ can 
spectacularly improve a country’s per-
formance, but not its competitiveness. 
As far as the Hungarian experience 
is concerned, the international compari-
son of the quantity indicators of struc-
tural change suggests that the Hungarian 
structural changes fit into the main 
global tendencies. However, the quality 
indicators point to the fact that Hungary 
integrated into the global patterns of 
economic activity at the lower end of the 
hierarchy of global production networks.  
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